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3Do You Always Fear What Frightens
You?
Beth Levin and Jason Grafmiller
3.1 Introduction
English has a rich inventory of psychological verbs, or psych-verbs:
verbs that describe the experiencing of some emotion. Of these, few are
cited as frequently as fear and frighten, exemplified in (1).1
(1) a. Indiana Jones feared the snakes.
b. The snakes frightened Indiana Jones.
Most likely, this verb pair is often used because its members appear
to refer to the same emotion and involve the same arguments — often
referred to as the experiencer and the stimulus2 — and yet they asso-
ciate those arguments with different syntactic positions. The verb fear
is representative of verbs whose experiencer argument is realized as the
subject, so-called experiencer-subject psych-verbs. Conversely, frighten
represents the experiencer-object psych-verbs, verbs which map their
experiencer argument to direct object, as the name implies. The fact
that doublets like the pair in (1) involve the same emotion, and os-
1We are pleased to dedicate this paper to Annie Zaenen, whose investigations of
unaccusativity, psych-verbs, and impersonal passives have inspired us to think hard
about agentivity and related notions, as we hope to have done in this paper. We
also thank the reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft.
2We use the label ‘stimulus’ (Talmy 1985) only as a way of referring to that
argument of a transitive psych-verb that is not the individual experiencing the
mental state described by the verb. This use of the term should not be taken to
indicate any particular theoretical position.
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tensibly refer to the same situation, has led many researchers to treat
these verbs as selecting arguments with the same semantic roles. This
common semantic role assignment presents a puzzle for theories that
assume that a semantic role is mapped to a unique syntactic position,
such as those adopting Baker’s Uniformity of Theta Role Assignment
(1988:46, 1997): Why should the experiencer (or stimulus) argument
be mapped to the subject of one verb, and to the object of the other?
Some researchers have approached this puzzle from a syntactic per-
spective, positing a common syntactic analysis for both verbs despite
the surface differences in argument realization. For instance, one verb’s
realization of these two arguments can be (at least partially) reduced to
the other’s (Belletti and Rizzi 1988, Postal 1971). Alternatively, other
researchers have questioned whether the two verbs really have argu-
ments sharing the same semantic roles; if they do not, then there may
not be a mapping puzzle to begin with. These researchers have proposed
that the situations described by the two verbs differ in their causal or
aspectual structure (Arad 1998, Croft 1993, Grimshaw 1990, Klein and
Kutscher 2002, Pesetsky 1995, Reinhart 2001). Zaenen (1993), among
others, draws attention to the subject of frighten and other experiencer-
object psych-verbs, arguing that it is no less a causer than the subject
of regular transitive causative verbs such as break or melt — an analysis
not incompatible with the label ‘stimulus’.3 She incorporates Dowty’s
(1991) proto-role approach into LFG’s Lexical Mapping Theory frame-
work (Bresnan and Kanerva 1989). Specifically, she argues that the
proto-agent properties entailed by the meaning of frighten determine
that the stimulus receives an ‘intrinsic classification’ which guarantees
its mapping to grammatical subject. For her, and others utilizing such
a proto-role approach (e.g. Davis and Koenig 2000, Klein and Kutscher
2002), causation is among the proto-agent properties entailed by the
meaning of frighten to hold of its stimulus.
What has received less attention is the status of the object of fear,
which despite the label ‘stimulus’, presumably does not qualify as a
causer, since otherwise it would be a subject. Even if, as Zaenen (1993),
Dowty (1991), and others note, causation is attributed to this argu-
ment, its actual semantic contribution has not received the attention
that the stimulus of frighten has. The precise differences in the types
3These arguments have been based in large part on the syntactic behavior of
frighten and other experiencer-object psych-verbs, which on closer examination does
not parallel that of fear and other experiencer-subject psych-verbs (Bouchard 1995,
Grimshaw 1990, Pesetsky 1995, Reinhart 2001). For example, experiencer-object
verbs pattern with typical transitive causatives with respect to middle formation,
resultative predication, and –er nominal formation (Chung 1998, Iwata 1995).
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of ‘stimulus’ arguments psych-verbs take, and the part these argument
types play in shaping the syntactic structures that their verbs are found
in, therefore require further study. Building on the groundwork laid out
by Zaenen and others, we investigate the nature of these arguments
through a corpus study of the verbs fear and frighten and show that a
better understanding of the semantics of so-called ‘stimulus’ arguments
of fear and frighten further supports Zaenen’s overall approach.
3.2 Fear and frighten are not converses
Before turning to the corpus study, we mention an additional clue that
the subject of frighten and the object of fear are likely to be different
despite the assignment of the label ‘stimulus’ to both: the paucity of
doublets like fear and frighten in English. Although these verbs are
frequently cited together in studies of psych-verbs, they are not repre-
sentative of a general pattern in the language. Most experiencer-subject
verbs lack experiencer-object counterparts referring to the same emo-
tion and vice versa. The only other easily identifiable doublet of this
type consists of like and please, and further doublets are more difficult
to discern. Other possible candidates might include: abhor or detest
vs. disgust or revolt ; dislike vs. bother, bug, or annoy ; and love or en-
joy vs. delight.4 If the stimulus truly bears the same semantic relation
to psych-verbs of the two types, then such doublets should be found
across the psych-verb inventory. That they are not suggests that the
two types of verbs convey different kinds of psychological events, and
the title of the paper was chosen to suggest precisely this.
The intuition that the so-called stimulus arguments of fear and
frighten are not semantically quite the same is also supported by
changes in acceptability and/or meaning when the two NPs in a sen-
tence with one verb are ‘flipped’ around so they can occur with the
other verb, i.e. when the sentence X fears/feared Y is changed to Y
frightens/frightened X, or vice versa. In many instances, such as in (1),
rephrasing a sentence involving one verb with the other verb does not
affect acceptability. The (a) sentences in (2)-(5) are corpus examples
which sound quite natural when switched with their hypothetical fear
or frighten variants, as in the (b) sentences.
4Given the scarcity of doublets such as fear and frighten, it is not surprising
that a single psych-verb does not show the two argument realization options that
characterize these two verbs. In this respect, psych-verbs contrast with dative al-
ternation verbs such as give or send and locative alternation verbs such as spray
or load, which show argument alternations. Our proposal, that experiencer-subject
and experiencer-object psych-verbs have fundamentally different meanings, explains
the lack of psych-verbs showing these two argument realizations.
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(2) a. The government fears the answers to these questions.
b. The answers to these questions frighten the government.
(3) a. You have people in this country now saying that they fear the
Japanese economy . . .
b. You have people in this country now saying that the Japanese
economy frightens them . . .
(4) a. The darkness and the black depths frightened me.
b. I feared the darkness and the black depths.
(5) a. Extreme side effects frighten patients.
b. Patients fear extreme side effects.
Although these examples suggest that sentences with one of the two
verbs can often be rephrased with the other, it is not difficult to find
examples with one verb that lack a counterpart with the other. The
(b) sentences in (6)-(9), which are the ‘flipped’ counterparts of the
naturally occurring (a) sentences, are distinctly odd.
(6) a. They dropped everything and ran when something frightened
them.
b. ??They dropped everything and ran when they feared some-
thing.
(7) a. “Sorry if I frightened you last night,” she told me.
b. ??“Sorry if you feared me last night,” she told me.
(8) a. Did you fear a negative response from fans?
b. ??Did a negative response from fans frighten you?
(9) a. He “hesitated fatally on the edge of his own political transfor-
mation. . . He feared the new.”
b. ??He “hesitated fatally on the edge of his own political trans-
formation. . . The new frightened him.”
These data suggest that far from being a simple ‘flipped’ doublet, the
verbs fear and frighten have differential preferences for certain types of
arguments. This is especially clear in (8): the frighten variant (8b) can
only be understood as presupposing that a negative response has in
fact happened, while the fear example (8a) carries no such presupposi-
tion. In (8a) the experiencer fears merely the possibility of something
happening. That is, there was no specific event that happened to cause
him or her to become afraid. In the next section we present further
evidence that this example represents a general tendency for comple-
ments of fear to refer to abstractions, e.g. propositions, properties and
concepts, and for subjects of frighten to refer to more concrete entities,
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e.g. humans, physical objects, and events. These differences, we argue,
reflect the different semantic relations that the ‘stimulus’ bears to verbs
of the two types.
3.3 Corpus study
We now present the results of a corpus study examining the verbs fear
and frighten. Data were collected from the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA) containing approximately 425 million words
of spoken and written varieties of standard American English from 1990
to the present day (Davies 2008-2011).
3.3.1 Notes on data collection and annotation
To construct our corpus, we initially collected 500 examples of each
verb from COCA using lemma searches which return hits for all possi-
ble inflected forms of the verb (e.g. fear, fears, feared, fearing). Sentence
tokens that did not include both an experiencer and a stimulus were
excluded, e.g. their intention was to frighten to the point where our na-
tion would not act, as were examples of fear for and frighten off/away,
which have different semantic properties from their counterparts. Fi-
nally, we excluded fixed uses such as nothing to fear and fear the worst.
After removing such tokens we were left with 711 examples (fear =
365, frighten = 346).
Since this study focused on the types of stimuli involved, coding and
annotation was most detailed for these arguments. For each token, the
stimulus was coded for properties known to influence argument real-
ization: definiteness, number, syntactic category (pronoun vs. full NP
vs. full clause), and most importantly animacy. The animacy categories
along with examples from the corpus are provided in Table 1.
3.3.2 Results
The results of animacy coding are presented in Table 2. The most no-
ticeable difference between the two verbs is that frighten exhibits a more
even distribution of stimulus types, with a preference for more con-
crete entities (human, animate and physical objects) overall (53.3%).
Fear in contrast, displays a very strong bias (73.2%) toward abstrac-
tions (abstract entities and propositions).5 Events and activities, which
occupy an intermediate position on scales of concreteness or ‘world
immanence’, show a tendency to be treated conceptually and linguisti-
cally more like concrete objects than abstractions (Asher 2000, Hegarty
2003). In accordance with this tendency, we observe a slight bias toward
5These findings corroborate and extend those of Grimm (2007), who found a
similar pattern in data from the British National Corpus.
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Animacy Coding Corpus Examples
Human ‘Husbands and boyfriends’, ‘Afghan
women’, ‘the police’
Animate (non-human) ‘God’, ‘crocodilians’, ‘the bear’
Concrete Object ‘chemical weapons’, ‘side effects’, ‘the
sound of the wind’, ‘beds’
Event or Activity ‘a direct assault on the city’, ‘an ambush’,
‘my father crying’
Abstract Entity ‘the number 13’, ‘her need’, ‘disapproval’,
‘an impulse’, ‘disgrace’
Proposition ‘that North Korea could collapse’, ‘I
couldn’t feel him breathing’
TABLE 1 Animacy categories with examples
event-referring stimuli with frighten over fear. The collapsed pattern of
stimulus animacy is shown in Figure 1.
Fear Frighten Total
N % N % N %
Human 37 10.1 110 33.3 147 21.2
Animate 10 2.7 13 3.9 23 3.3
Concrete object 20 5.5 53 16.1 73 10.5
Event 31 8.5 49 14.8 80 11.5
Abstract entity 142 38.9 87 26.4 229 32.9
Proposition 125 34.3 18 5.5 143 20.6
Total 365 100 330 100 695 100
TABLE 2 Distribution of stimulus animacy types by verb
Our corpus investigation demonstrates that fear heavily favors ab-
stract objects. This preference is reflected not only in the kinds of NP
complements it tends to take as in (10), but also in its frequent use
with sentential complements, most of which denote yet to be realized
propositions as in (11).
(10) a. Do you fear a quagmire for the international community?
b. . . . preceding the intervention, markets panicked, fearing an
imminent Greek default.
c. The authorities fear a possible destabilization . . .
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FIGURE 1 Distribution of stimulus animacy types by verb (collapsed)
(11) a. Space scientists fear that the manned space station . . . will
divert funds from space science in the ’90s.
b. They fear that Chinese state-owned enterprises will not hire
their employers if they are openly critical.
The future-oriented nature of these uses highlights the evaluative na-
ture of fear, which denotes an experiencer’s disposition toward some
(possibly non-existent) target. Such uses of fear are hard to reconcile
with analyses of fear events that postulate a direct causal relation be-
tween the stimulus and the experiencer. Conversely, frighten’s frequent
occurrence with concrete entities is entirely compatible with its usual
treatment as a canonical causative verb.
The broader patterns of usage in Table 2 and Figure 1 are revealing
on their own, but a closer look at the nominal stimuli found with the
two verbs shows that the differences go even further than the aggregated
numbers suggest. For example, a significantly larger proportion of fear
uses involve indefinite stimuli than frighten uses do (Fisher Exact test:
p < 3.3e−10), as shown in Table 3.
A closer look at these indefinite examples reveals that even with ap-
parent human referents, many objects of fear describe abstract concep-
tualizations of these human types, rather than discourse-new instances
of actual individuals (cf. I fear an earthquake vs. I felt an earthquake).
(12) a. Most were initially skeptical of this political Euclid and feared
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Fear Frighten
N % N %
Definite 113 49.7 129 85.5
Indefinite 114 50.3 22 14.5
TABLE 3 Distribution of definite and indefinite NP stimuli by verb
a conservative double agent in their midst.
b. Everyone fears an Efficiency Ogre!
The same pattern also holds for fear complements referring to events.
(13) a. From all the grumbling, I feared an encounter with a giant
Gerald Scarfe demon sitting on a throne . . .
b. He knew his troops were green and had families at home, and
he feared a direct assault on the city . . .
c. Bill Miller said he feared an ambush.
In contrast to fear, indefinite stimuli for frighten are quite rare, and
where found, they either refer to an existing entity that is simply new to
the discourse as in (14), or they involve generic statements expressing
a kind of episodic relation in which the stimulus typically causes fear
(Extreme side effects frighten patients).
(14) a. Stories of the Holocaust drifted across to America and fright-
ened him.
b. “They probably dropped everything and ran when something
frightened them,” I said. “A bear, maybe.”
c. Frightened by a blistering barrage of bombs, Russian recruits
. . . are shot by their own superiors as they try to jump ship.
As shown in Table 2, the two verbs prefer different types of NPs for
their stimulus, with fear showing a bias against concrete NPs. Another
interesting subset of these stimuli is observed in the interpersonal uses
of the two verbs — uses involving a human experiencer and a human
stimulus. While there are many fewer instances of fear with human
stimuli in the corpus data than frighten, the numbers do not tell the
whole story. The relationship between a human stimulus and an expe-
riencer with fear is often qualitatively different than with frighten: it
frequently involves an imbalance of power between the two participants.
In many instances, the stimulus constitutes an authority figure to the
experiencer: it is higher than the experiencer on some scale of status,
power or other comparable property. Further, this unequal relationship
is inherent in the nature of the stimulus, such as when the stimulus is
God or someone who holds a role that invests him or her with legal,
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political, or institutional power. It is not a temporary or accidental
relationship that simply holds because of the immediate situation or
context, but rather an inherent one that holds of the individuals across
contexts.
(15) a. King Henry is feared by his enemies — and his family.
b. He admires yet fears his father.
c. It was always wise to fear a wizard whose lips had touched
the Holy Grail.
In instances where this unequal relationship is not necessarily in-
ferrable from common knowledge, the relation of authority is made
clear in the context.
(16) I’d clawed to a position of respect as an accident reconstructionist.
As a consultant, I was valued by law enforcement and insurance
companies alike. As a professional witness, I was feared.
This asymmetric relation by no means holds across all uses of fear,
but the large number of such examples makes sense given the nature
of the emotion and the verb’s overwhelming tendency to express expe-
riencer dispositions or attitudes directed at some object.
Again, frighten contrasts with fear. Many of the interpersonal uses of
frighten involve similar imbalances between participants — not surpris-
ingly, as the verbs denote very similar emotions — but these relations
hold due to particular circumstances, rather than being inherent in
the relationship between the event participants. Although some human
stimuli clearly have roles that put them in an authority relation over
the experiencer, many of the examples make clear that the stimulus
evokes an emotion in the experiencer by his or her actions, rather than
as a consequence of a role invested in him or her, as in the following
examples. For example, the bracketed phrases in (17) and (18) expli-
cate the means by which the subject has managed to evoke fear in the
experiencer in a particular situation, and represents a common strategy
with experiencer-object verbs (Grafmiller in prep.).
(17) a. House Majority Leader Dick Armey complained that the pres-
ident was trying to frighten the congressman’s grandmother
[by demagoguing the impact of Medicaid cuts on nursing-home
care].
b. Another man looked thin and angry and frightened me [as
though he carried a knife although he was full of easy compli-
ments].
c. Most of the time she frightened me [because she was old]. . .
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(18) a. Matt frightened me [with his intensity].
b. I frightened him [with stories about the missiles that entered
buildings and shot up circular stairwells to find their target].
Providing such additional information is often necessary due to the
context-specific, circumstantial nature of frighten events. In other in-
stances, the stimulus is not truly a stimulus, but is better characterized
as the causer of the emotion, and the emotion is directed at something
else. For instance, in (19) what the experiencer is actually afraid of are
grizzlies, not whoever the subject of the sentence, they, refers to. They
are the cause of her fear only in that they brought to her attention the
possibility of grizzlies, i.e. the ‘subject matter’ of her fear (Pesetsky
1995).
(19) They tried to frighten her with talk of grizzlies, but she just looked
out the window at the low, treed terrain. . .
Such examples are not attested among the fear sentences and sup-
port the causative analysis of frighten. Given the causative nature of
this verb, this difference in the stimulus–experiencer relationship is to
be expected. In any given instance of ‘frightening’ it is possible that
any individual could potentially frighten another under the appropriate
circumstances.
3.4 Conclusion
In the introduction we reviewed the puzzle that doublets such as fear
and frighten pose for theories of argument realization and argued that
this puzzle resolves itself in light of claims by Zaenen (1993) and others
that experiencer-object psych-verbs like frighten entail certain proto-
agent properties of their stimuli, most importantly, causation. Con-
versely, experiencer-subject verbs like fear do not. Our corpus study
reveals significant differences in the nature of the stimulus noun phrases
found with these two verbs, which support these previous claims.
Our study shows that the stimuli found with frighten are truly
causers of the emotion experienced, thus further supporting the analy-
ses of Zaenen (1993) and Dowty (1991). This characterization receives
support from the significantly greater tendency for these stimuli to re-
fer to concrete entities or events in the immediate context. It is further
substantiated by the arbitrary connections between stimulus and expe-
riencer typical of many uses of frighten. These characteristics of frighten
sentences reflect the circumstantial nature of the direct causation de-
noted by this verb.
In contrast, the stimuli found with fear represent entities at which a
particular emotion can be directed, and the authority inherent in many
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of these stimuli simply reinforces this. Inherently fear-inducing entities,
events, or abstract notions need not be present in the immediate con-
text, or even exist at all, making a direct causal connection between the
stimulus and experiencer difficult to establish. The low degree of causal
efficacy possessed by these stimuli, along with the inherent imbalance
of authority or power between the experiencer and the stimulus sug-
gests that the experiencer’s mental state should be conceptualized as a
disposition directed toward something, rather than as a direct reaction
to an immediate stimulus.
The question we chose as this paper’s title, Do you always fear what
frightens you?, plays on these fundamental, but distinct properties of
fear and frighten, and was intended to evoke the long-standing con-
troversy over the relation between fear and frighten: whether they are
synonyms which take arguments with the same semantic roles, but ex-
pressed differently, as some work has suggested. The appropriate answer
to the title question is No, precisely because the meanings of the two
verbs are different in the way we have laid out. This answer suggests
that synonymy analyses cannot be right, and our corpus study reveals
not only the reasons why they cannot hold, but also why the question
receives the answer it does. These two verbs have distinct meanings, so
that you can indeed be frightened by things you do not fear.
References
Asher, Nicholas. 2000. Events, facts, propositions, and evolutive anaphora.
In J. Higginbotham, F. Pianesi, and A. Varzi, eds., Speaking of Events,
pages 123–150. Oxford University Press.
Baker, Mark. 1988. Incorporation: A Theory of Grammatical Function
Changing . University of Chicago Press.
Baker, Mark. 1997. Thematic roles and syntactic structure. In L. Haegeman,
ed., Elements of Grammar , pages 73–137. Kluwer.
Davies, Mark. 2008–. The Corpus of Contemporary American En-
glish (COCA): 425+ million words, 1990-present. Available online at
http://www.americancorpus.org.
Davis, Anthony and Jean-Pierre Koenig. 2000. Linking as constraints on
word classes in a hierarchical lexicon. Language 76:56–91.
Dowty, David. 1991. Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language
67:547–619.
Grafmiller, Jason. In prep. Agentivity and Argument Realization in English
Psychological Verbs. PhD thesis, Stanford University.
Grimm, Scott. 2007. Flip verbs right side up. MS. Stanford University.
Hegarty, Michael. 2003. Semantic types of abstract entities. Lingua 113:891–
927.
32 / Beth Levin and Jason Grafmiller
Talmy, Leonard. 1985. Lexicalization patterns: semantic structure in lexical
forms. In T. Shopen, ed., Language, Typology and Syntactic Description 3:
Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, pages 57–149. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Zaenen, Annie. 1993. Unaccusativity in Dutch: Integrating syntax and lexical
semantics. In J. Pustejovsky, ed., Semantics and the Lexicon. Kluwer.
